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1. INTRODUCTION 
The issue of space debris has already for some time 
been very high upon the agenda of scientists, worrying 
about the hture possibilities to undertake astronomical 
observations from earth. Currentlv, these worries are 
. , 
increasingly spreading to the public at large, in view of 
the risks of damage being caused on earth - the de- 
orbiting of Mir, in a way the largest piece of space 
debris ever, was a media issue for many weeks. And 
even commercially oriented entities are rapidly coming 
to realise that the growing amount of tiny objects in 
outer space will not just obstmct or endanger scientific 
exploration, but also the commercial exploitation of 
outer space. 
Hence, the issue has also worried legal experts, e.g. in 
the context of UNCOPUOS where it is a recurring 
agenda item. Here, however, some caution must be had. 
Legal experts have been discussing legal aspects of 
space debris for quite some time, and actually many 
legal proposals have seen the light of day, from fairly 
simple extensions of interpretations of legal terms to 
challenging new instruments. 
For example, a few years ago a scientific team at the 
Department of Aerospace and Mechanical Engineering 
at the University of Arizona had devised a spectacular 
project to actually go out into debris-rich orbits with a 
space garbage collector - the ASPOD [I]. It was even 
patented - patents representing a legal instrument 
clearly used to achieve either a scientific or a 
commercial objective (or both) - but, as it turned out, 
the patent was never used. Actual building, launch and 
operation of the ASPOD would have cost millions of 
US dollars without bringing, as such, direct financial 
benefits to those paying those dollars. 
Thus, in the last resort it is not law that will solve the 
problem of space debris, or at least solve it on its own. 
Once money andlor political will are there, law will be 
able to offer a number of interesting mechanisms for 
trying to ensure that such money would be well spent 
and such political will would be translated into useful 
practical results. But as long as the solutions that exist 
are seen as costing too much money or as resulting in 
unacceptable checks on national sovereignty, with 
perhaps a few interesting exceptions legal solutions 
would remain merely sleeping solutions. Would the 
waiting not perhaps be for a crucial triggering event, 
waking everyone up to the danger? 
Fortunately, recent developments seem to suggest that 
such a crucial event would perhaps not be necessary; 
that the mere accumulation of, as such as of yet still 
minor, problems make states and other relevant players 
more willing to consider real improvements, perhaps 
even at the cost of substantial sums of money or of 
sovereignty. Hence, it may be rather timely to take a 
second look at what the law would be able to contribute 
in this regard. 
2. SPACE DEBRIS AVD INTERNATIONAL 
SPACE LAW 
The word "space debris" is wholly absent from 
international space law - i.e. the five treaties commonly 
known as 'space treaties' plus five United Nations 
General ~'sembly ~esolutions providing for 
authoritative, albeit as such non-binding principles [2]. 
Without yet going into definitional issues, there is little 
more than the one clause in the Outer Space Treaty's 
Article IX coming close to dealing with this issue. It 
provides in particular that, in case of potentially 
harmhl effects being foreseen as a consequence of a 
particular space activity, the state undertaking the 
activity should inform and consult, within the limits of 
reasonableness, the other states possibly concerned. 
There is, however, no such thing as a clear and 
unconditional prohibition of causing space debris by 
one's activities in the first place, or an obligation of 
removing it once it has come into existence. 
Worthy of mentioning is further the Resolution of 1992 
on the use of Nuclear Power Sources, since it at least 
provides for some general guidelines for the safe 
operation of a special category of hazardous space 
activities, i.e. those involving the use of nuclear power 
sources. Obviously, this is of importance when it comes 
to the prevention of space debris, although one has to 
take note of the fact that the Principles as such are not 
formally binding, and of a rather technical character. 
In addition, a few more Articles may be quoted that are 
of much wider relevance than just for this issue, but 
nevertheless have some specific impact also here once 
it comes to legal ways for dealing with space debris. 
Article VI of the Outer Space Treaty thus provides that 
states are internationally responsible for national 
activities in outer space, including those of non- 
governmental entities and international organisations. 
In other words: once relevant obligations 1-e space 
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debris-prevention or -mitigation are to be established, it 
is up to the relevant states to ensure that also private 
entities and intergovernmental organisations will 
adhere to such rules. [3] 
By contrast, Article I1 of the Outer Space Treaty 
provides for the absence of sovereignty, at least on a 
territorial basis, in outer space. For the issue of fighting 
space debris with legal means and instruments, this 
means that new rules and obligations as regards that 
area can never be established by a single state, but have 
to be principally established at the international level. 
National laws to be applied on a territorial basis do not 
apply; national laws to be applied on a personal basis 
only can be applied to those cases where a state's own 
nationals are the relevant actors, i.e. not on a 
comprehensive basis. [4] 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty to some extent 
mitigates the above consequence of the absence of 
sovereignty in outer space by providing that a state may 
(continue to) exercise jurisdiction over a space object 
carried on its national registry also when it is in outer 
space [5]. Thus, it may legally provide for rules and 
obligations regarding its operation in outer space that 
may diminish the potential harmful impact of space 
debris, even uftev the space object has already entered 
outer space. 
Finally, the Rescue Agreement is worth mentioning 
here, since it deals with space objects likely damaged 
andor posing certain threats to cause damage in the 
course of their return to earth. The purport of the legal 
regime provided by the Agreement, however, is to 
provide for assistance-related obligations and a safe and 
expeditious return home of the space object and 
possible astronauts on board, not to deal with any 
potentially harmful aspects of such space objects in 
their possible quality of 'space debris'. 
In the end, one anyhow has to realise that space debris 
is not, legally speaking, an ethical, scientific or 
academic problem in itself, but constitutes a problem 
because of some of its practical consequences and 
ramifications. Hence, it is usually phrased by lawyers in 
terms of the damage caused by such debris and any 
liability for it, as the most down-to-earth aspect of these 
consequences and ramifications. This leads to three 
major problems to be solved. 
3. THE DEFINITIONAL ISSUE: 'SPACE 
DEBRIS' AND 'SPACE OBJECT' 
The first question that arises in this regard concerns 
to what extent space debris would still fall within the 
definition of "space object" or "component parts" 
thereof, so as to trigger application of the Liability 
Convention in cases of damage. Here, providing for 
an authoritative international interpretation of space 
debris would certainly be an interesting option. Many 
such efforts have indeed been undertaken. In 
particular Professor Perek has spent considerable 
attention to this issue. [6] 
The underlying problem is that also "space object" has 
nnt heen defined in anv n~hqtantial manner The firqt 
effort at definition of Art. I(d) of the Liability 
Convention and Art. I(b) of the Registration 
Convention does not do much more than shift the issue, 
by including in the scope of the term "space object" 
also its "component parts". Nevertheless, it has 
generally been agreed upon, that this at least provides 
for a rather extensive scope: the classical example of a 
screwdriver let loose in outer space still being a 
component part of the space object it originally came 
from. 
Consequently, few would dispute that for example 
large parts of a satellite after its explosion would also 
constitute component parts, and hence be equated with 
space objects. The major advantage thereof is that any 
damage then caused by such component parts would 
fall within the scope of the Liability Convention, i.e. 
leading at least to a theoretical possibility of 
compensation. [7] 
Practical problems would still arise in view of the fact 
for example that the dispute settlement mechanism 
under the Liability Convention, in case the liable 
state(s) do not accept to pay after diplomatic 
consultation, does not pev se lead to a binding decision. 
Such a binding decision can only result if both parties 
to the dispute so agree beforehand, which may not be 
the case too often. [8] 
A more fundamental problem arises with another legal 
aspect of space objects. While the definition as such of 
a certain piece of metal as a "space object" is necessary 
(though not sufficient) to trigger application of the 
Liability Convention, it also triggers possible 
application of Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty 
and the Registration Convention. 
A space object after all can be - and usually indeed is - 
registered nationally, which means that the registration 
state retains jurisdiction and control over it - and calls, 
legally speaking, for solution of salvage problems 
similar to those in the law of the sea. Is anyone else but 
the owner of (and, in this case, also the sovereign over) 
the space object entitled to establish control over it, 
even if it is useless, for the reason that it is endangering 
the former's life or interests or has already caused 
damage thereto, and for the consequent purpose of 
deflecting such dangers or collecting evidence? Should 
an act of 'abandonment' explicitly take place, or be 
presumed? Such legal issues, if remaining unsolved, 
will certainly hamper any ASPOD-like or other debris- 
mitigating activity in outer space. 
Intev uliu for such reasons a definition which would 
establish space debris as a sub-category within "space 
objects" or "component parts", namely a sub-category 
subject to liability but not to the continuation of 
jurisdiction and control, or at least allowing for 
abandonment andlor salvage-like rights of other states 
or actors involved, might be desirable. 
Thus, amongst others Professor Perek tends to lean 
towards a definition of space debris focusing on the 
(lack of) usefulness of the space object, since it would 
obviously be easier for a registration state to accept 
ahandnnment and/or action< hv  other <tat?< i f  it dne< 
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not have any use anymore for that space object. In other 
words: a space object should be considered space 
debris as soon as it stops having any sort of practical 
function, while remaining a space object for liability 
purposes nevertheless (albeit, logically speaking, only 
where the salvor does not incur liability himself for 
specific actions undertaken with the space object in 
question and the consequences of such actions). 
Obviously, then, first of all, one would have to 
elaborate what further consequences are to be exactly 
attached to such a new sub-category of space objects. 
More importantly, however, is that this discussion is of 
relevance only for those space objects or component 
parts which are large or distinct enough to be identified 
- and hence for the liable state(s) to be identified. This, 
however, is only applicable to a minor part of the space 
debris floating around in outer space, at least 
quantitatively speaking. 
4. THE IDENTIFICATION ISSUE: 
STRENGTHENING THE REGISTRATION 
CONVENTION 
Thus, secondly the practical problem of identification 
has to be faced: in case a certain piece of space debris 
can not be relatedlequated to a specific space object, 
effective operation of the Liability Convention for the 
purpose of redeeming damage is precluded. More 
stringent and comprehensive application in practice of 
the Registration Convention would have some positive 
effects in this respect, although it would never be able 
to solve the problem altogether. 
Nevertheless, it is worthwhile here to briefly consider 
efforts currently or possibly being undertaken in this 
respect. Establishment of the Registration Convention 
for a large part was motivated by the desire to provide 
for means of identifying the launching state or states of 
a particular subject, in the event such space object 
would cause damage recoverable under the Liability 
Convention. Obviously, for space objects no longer 
functioning properly, or more to the point to be 
characterised as, alternatively having given rise to 
space debris, this is of special importance. 
Article VIII of the Outer Space Treaty, by providing 
registration states the option to (continue to) exercise 
over space objects registered, at least stimulates actual 
registration in a national register. Following upon this, 
the Registration Convention does require international 
notification, namely to the Secretary General of the 
United Nations, of any space object so registered, thus 
making it possible for any party so interested to become 
aware of that space object's presence in outer space as 
well as some of its operational parameters. 
However, to begin with the obligation or even 
suggestion of applying a proper registration mark was 
not provided for, partly because from a practical 
perspective it seemed to make little sense viz. be very 
difficult to achieve in any satisfactory measure by 
current technical means. 
Also the parameters that were to be provided in 
arrnrdanre with Article TV(1) of  the Re~iqtratinn 
Convention to the UN Secretary General remained very 
basic: only the general function and character of the 
space object, plus a few fundamental orbital 
parameters. Moreover, there was no formal requirement 
to notify any change to these parameters, though the 
possibility to do so was offered under para. (2). 
More importantly, any notification anyhow under 
Article IV(1) of the Registration Convention was only 
"as soon as practicable", which could well turn out to 
mean in actual fact 'after the space object had already 
ceased hnctioning', or worse still, simply 'never'. 
Especially with military or other strategic satellites, this 
was an evidently attractive escape clause, but also in 
many civil cases notification, if at all, was notoriously 
late, imprecise or otherwise unsatisfactory. 
Finally, the clause of Article IV(3) may be noted, 
where provision is made for states notifying the UN 
Secretary General that previously registered space 
objects "no longer are in Earth orbit". This clause 
however is even severely curtailed in its effectiveness 
by two qualifications: "to the greatest extent feasible" 
and "as soon as practicable". 
In this respect, it is indeed interesting to refer to the 
current efforts being undertaken in UNCOPUOS to 
come to more stringent requirements for registration 
states in terms of international notification to the 
Secretary General. Especially the time frame for 
notification is to be made shorter and more difficult in 
law to circumvent, and also any changes in essential 
parameters after launch and in-orbit delivery should 
now become subject to obligatory notification. In this 
respect, the growing practical relevance of in-orbit 
lease or even sale, ideally leading to a proper re- 
registration requirement and procedure, should be 
mentioned. 
In the last resort however, obviously even 
comprehensive universal adherence to much tightened 
registration requirements will not be nearly sufficient to 
solve this aspect of space debris - allowing victims of 
damage caused by space debris to trace such damage 
back to an identifiable launching, and hence liable, 
state. Especially after break-ups, explosions or 
collisions it may soon be impossible to 'reverse- 
engineer' the track of tiny particles to the original, 
clearly identifiable space object. 
5. THE COMPENSATION ISSUE: TOWARDS A 
GUARANTEE FUND? 
This is where the third problem arises: how to deal with 
the damage caused by those pieces of debris which can 
not be retraced to a certain space object and thereby to 
a certain launching state? Theoretically speaking, 
options discussed by space lawyers and other experts 
have tended to focus on mitigation or prevention of 
such damage being caused in the first place. 
Such a preventive option could be found e.g. in the 
establishment of a worldwide monitoring system, 
tracking debris not only in a more comprehensive 
fashion than is already the case, but also making these 
data available tn a11 t h n ~ e  nntentiallv intereqted NACA 
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is apparently doing an interesting and much welcomed 
job with some measure of comprehensiveness, in 
tracking all sorts of traceable objects down to quite 
small sizes, and some other organisations such as 
ESAIESOC, NASDA and Rosaviakosmos are also 
building up capacity in this respect. Nevertheless, the 
general impression is that this is as of yet far from 
enough for satisfying the demand for transparent, easily 
accessible and readily available information on all 
potentially endangering space debris, especially the 
smaller particles. 
There may be some room in this regard, therefore, for 
further capacity building, establishing a global and 
interdependent system of monitoring, hopefully with 
ever-increasing precision and detection-capabilities. 
Nevertheless, this option clearly also has its 
fundamental limits, not just when it comes to its proper 
task - tracking and monitoring space debris, and 
warning those potentially endangered by it - but even 
more so when it comes to the more fundamental issue 
of preventing damage from being caused by such space 
debris. 
Another preventive legal option relates to after-mission 
planning, and in the case of private activities, the 
inclusion of provisions regarding obligatory after- 
mission scenarios in relevant launch or space licenses 
in the widest sense of the word, e.g. re-orbiting or de- 
orbiting, or in a 'negative' sense prohibiting explosion. 
A lesser option, maybe especially interesting as a 
starting point, would be to merely require an after- 
mission scenario to be included, in order to start forcing 
the operating entities at least to think seriously about 
these issues. 
Whilst this is clearly an interesting - and hence already 
oftentimes discussed - venue, in the end it requires the 
political will of states to accept for themselves or for 
their private entities a certain additional economic cost. 
This will probably only happen if a substantial number 
of states will decide to accept such an extra cost- 
generating measure at the same time. 
Furthermore, in case of private entities it indeed 
requires the existence or establishment of a licensing 
system, presumably under a national space law of some 
sort, to implement such international consensus. In this 
respect, it is noteworthy to realise that, so far, only 
eight states have actually realised any measure of 
comprehensive national space legislation including a 
system for authorisation - if sometimes very 
rudimentary only. This concerns, in more or less 
chronological order, the United States, Norway, 
Sweden, the United Kingdom, the Russian Federation, 
South Africa, Australia and the Ukraine. [9] 
In addition, one might refer to the case of France, 
which has at least realised a special form of 
authorisation of Arianespace's launching activities in 
conjunction with the other member states of the 
European Space Agency, and is now in the process of 
drafting a proper national space law. The latter also 
applies, in varying degrees, to such European states as 
Gennanv the Netherland< Relpii~m and Ttalv a< well 
as such important space-faring states as Japan, India, 
Brazil and Argentina. 
Nevertheless, in this area a lot remains to be done, 
especially to the extent that a substantial form of 
international harmonisation of national licensing 
systems might be required to prevent the phenomenon 
of 'flags of convenience', so well known from the law 
of the sea, from arising. Potential space entrepreneurs 
should not be able to shop for the most convenient 
licensing requirements in this respect. 
All such options, however, will be fundamentally 
unable to preclude the occurrence of any damage as a 
consequence of space debris, whether existing or 
future. This brings us to the last option to be briefly 
discussed here: that of establishment of an international 
guarantee fund, similar to the one existing nationally in 
many countries with regard to road transport, which 
will compensate damage caused by unidentifiable space 
debris. The h n d  would be financed at least largely by 
the active space-faring community, for example by an 
obligatory contribution to it in the form of a particular 
percentage of the launch cost. 
More refined options would be, for example, to link the 
contribution to the fund to a 'maximum probable loss', 
to be determined in an objective way, for example 
through the insurance premiums to the extent these 
would provide for 'objective' (since resulting from 
calculations by commercial enterprise guided by the 
Invisible Hand of competition) and comparable 
standards of risk, or similar devices. Not only would in 
this way any launch contribute to the launch fund, but 
also a substantial further impetus would be given to 
individual launch providers to enhance the safety of 
their operations further so as to diminish such 
'maximum probable loss' or other relevant concept, 
and hence their obligatory contribution. 
It is obvious, that such elaborated additions to the 
existing body of space law would require most 
probably even more than an amendment, such as a 
distinct treaty or protocol. In terms of strategy, 
however, putting discussions of such proposals on the 
agenda of the Legal Subcommittee of UNCOPUOS 
might serve as a push to arrive at least at other, less far- 
fetched and cumbersome additions required to enhance 
the effectiveness of space law vis-d-vis the growing 
problem of space debris. 
Also, however, again one should realise that in regard 
of private entities involved in particular in launching 
activities, but indirectly certainly also those undertaking 
other space activities, any such results can only be 
achieved under the current configuration of 
international law by means of national space laws and 
their licensing systems. Thus, another element of 
uncertainty and non-comprehensiveness is introduced 
into the equation, to be tackled preferably by 
UNCOPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee in providing 
for obligatory core common elements of such licensing 
systems in this respect. 
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6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
In conclusion, it is encouraging to see that 
increasingly not just scientists, but also the public at 
large and the commercial sectors are becoming aware 
of the potential threats to their interests caused by the 
growing population of space debris. Thus, it would 
seem the appropriate time now to start thinking and 
discussing in detail the possible ways and means in 
which 'law' can help mitigate the threats posed by 
space debris, even if in the last resort one has to be 
modest about the possibilities for law to achieve 
effective results without the concurrence of money 
and political will. 
In furthering the positive contribution of the law to 
the mitigation of the harmful consequences of space 
debris, then, various entities would have to fulfil their 
respective roles. 
At the global international level it would be in 
particular UNCOPUOS and its Legal Subcommittee 
which should help develop the international 
framework, including working towards harmonised 
licensing regimes. Thus, efforts to arrive at coherent 
and effective definitions of such key terms as "space 
objects" and "space debris", and to develop rules 
regarding abandonment and salvage-like rights when 
a particular space objectlpiece of space debris has no 
longer any visible function yet may substantially 
threaten other state's interests, e.g. in terms of 
operating satellites. 
Also, more specific and substantive law may be 
developed, if necessary firstly by means of 'soft', 
non-binding law such as Resolutions, guidelines or 
codes of conduct which later on could develop, if of 
proven value and feasibility, into 'hard' law. This 
should focus on establishing duties for any launching 
party in earlier stages to provide for an after-mission 
scenario of whatever nature, later on for particular 
after-mission scenarios. The latter, stronger option 
however likely requires more technical and scientific 
research, e.g. as to the relative benefits and risks 
involved in such scenario's as de-orbiting, re-orbiting 
and passivation. 
In case of private launch parties, of course, such 
substantive duties would then have to be 
implemented through licensing systems. This is, 
consequently, where the second group of 'space 
players' comes into the picture: the individual states. 
Only they have the legal power and means to 
effectively impose the relevant obligations upon 
private operators, and monitor and enforce them, and 
this will not change in the foreseeable future, in spite 
of repeated clamours for a World Space Organisation 
or similar ideas. 
Thus, those states which already do have some sort of 
licensing system should make sure that it will be 
constantly tuned to whatever international guidelines, 
codes of conducts or binding legal regulations will 
prescribe, whereas those states not yet having such a 
licensing system but nevertheless principally 
a l l n w i n ~  their nrivate entities tn hecnme invnlved in 
space activities, should be pressured into establishing 
such licensing system in line with current 
international requirements. 
A third important role finally is to be played by the 
intergovernmental organisations. As mechanisms for 
joint efforts of states they play a particularly 
important role in space activities, and hence should 
play a particular role also in leading the way. 
Collective standards are to that extent already more 
easily acceptable to individual states in that the 
relative disadvantage borne by a state accepting the 
costs of debris-mitigating measures as towards other 
states not (yet) accepting them is shared with the 
other member states. Also, in view of their public 
international status, they may play an important role 
in establishing international customary law, since 
they may represent state practice andlor opinio juris 
of a number of states. 
Thus, such organisations as ESA and Intersputnik, 
but also INTELSAT, IMSO and EUTELSAT to the 
extent that these may still (continue to) be classified 
as intergovernmental organisations, may have an 
important pioneering role to play. A special mention 
finally may be made here of the IADC, which, 
though no intergovernmental organisation in itself, 
also represents an important platform for relevant 
individual states as well as ESA to establish an even 
wider consensus on necessary, if perhaps costly 
measures. 
Whilst maybe it will never be possible to completely 
fill the pit before the cow falls in (in reference to a 
famous Dutch saying), there may still be a realistic 
chance of at least making it so much shallower that 
the cow, once one comes to fall in, will not fall as 
deep and as painful as otherwise. Obviously, there 
would already be great benefit for all mankind in 
that. [lo] 
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